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INTRODUCTION 
 Following the end of World War II, the new leaders of world politics gathered together 
and created the United Nations and subsequent international human rights laws with the goal of 
maintaining international peace and stability and eradicating genocide. However, almost a 
century later, it is clear that these goals have not been met, as human rights violations continue to 
be a pervasive global problem. While scholars diverge on the extent to which they think 
international human rights law is implemented and enforced, no scholar argues that international 
law sees the routine, effective, and consistent enforcement that would be desirable. The 
continued prevalence of human rights abuses and disregard for international human rights law 
has resulted in cynicism towards international human rights law as a whole. For example, 
Ambassador to Yugoslavia Warren Zimmermann described western diplomatic attempts to stop 
genocide as “a kind of cynical theater, a pretense of useful activity, a way of disguising a lack of 
will… impotent and ridiculous.”1 However, while Zimmermann is correct to condemn the lack 
of western action in Yugoslavia, there are times when the international community has taken 
strong, decisive actions against human rights abuses.2 Binder names this selective 
interventionism the “selectivity gap," in which very similar cases of human rights abuses are 
treated very differently by the international community.3 This article will address the selectivity 
gap in international responses to human rights crises between 1991 and 2001, with a particular 
emphasis on responses from the United States, and argue that political factors such as diplomatic 
alignment are important indicators of the likelihood of intervention, alongside traditionally cited 
 
1 Heidenrich, John G. “Forms of Nonviolent Pressure: Diplomacy, Economic Trade, and Nonviolent Resistance." In 
How to Prevent Genocide : A Guide for Policymakers, Scholars, and the Concerned Citizen. Westport, Conn.: 
Praeger, 2001: 94. 
2 Binder, Martin. "Humanitarian Crises and the International Politics of Selectivity." Human Rights Review 
(Piscataway, N.J.) 10, no. 3 (2009): 328. 
3  Binder, Martin. "Humanitarian Crises and the International Politics of Selectivity": 328. 
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factors such as economic development and geostrategic concerns. Though we are living in a 
period of relative decline in United States power, the conclusions of this article are important for 
several reasons. First, the United States still maintains a relatively large influence in the 
international system, though certainly not as large as it once was, so US concerns will continue 
to have implications for international responses to human rights violations for the time being. 
Second, current indicators for the likelihood of intervention can be applied to future international 
decision makers, including either new hegemons or groups of powerful states with influence over 
humanitarian intervention. 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
One of the major debates in current international relations scholarship is the extent to 
which international human rights law meaningfully influences state behavior. Louis Henkin 
argues that “almost all nations observe almost all principals of international law and almost all of 
their obligations almost all of the time."4 This assumption that states generally comply with the 
international treaties to which they are signatories has been generally accepted in scholarship 
pertaining to international law compliance, primarily because of the argument that states are 
unlikely to ratify treaties with which they do not intend to comply.5 However, recent 
developments in quantitative studies of human rights law compliance find mixed results, 
indicating that nondemocratic states often fail to comply with human rights treaties, even after 
signing them.6 Thus, recent research has focused on the factors that influence countries’ levels of 
 
4 Danceanu, Constanza Fernandez. "Systematic Review of the Causes of Latin American States' Compliance With 
International Human Rights Law." Human Rights Quarterly 41, no. 3 (2019): 553. 
5 Danceanu, Constanza Fernandez. "Systematic Review of the Causes of Latin American States' Compliance With 
International Human Rights Law”: 553-554. 
6 Hathaway, Oona A. "Do Human Rights Treaties Make a Difference?" The Yale Law Journal 111, no. 8 (2002): 
1935-2042. 
3 
compliance with human rights. Further, recent qualitative studies have concluded that countries 
often do not comply with international human rights treaties because of the low likelihood of 
incurring costs for noncompliance.7 This raises further questions about what factors determine 
the limited number of cases in which the international community does choose to intervene in 
situations of human rights violations. 
The three major paradigms of international relations diverge in the extent to which they 
believe international law can influence state behavior. According to realism, international law 
has little hope of influencing the way that states behave, unless it is enforced by a hegemon. As 
Danceanu points out, realism asserts that “states are constantly seeking to gain or to maintain 
power in order to assert and ensure their own interests."8 As a result, realists argue that 
international law merely serves as an instrument for powerful states to assert their self-interests 
and will only continue to exist when it serves the interests of dominant states.9 While this may 
seem like a grim prospective for human rights compliance, Neumayer argues that the realist 
perspective actually bodes well for human rights in the current international system because of 
the United States’ relatively positive record of upholding human rights.10 However, powerful 
countries rarely devote their resources to enforcing international human rights law, resulting in 
an opportunity for states to rhetorically agree to human rights without actually complying in 
 
Hafner-Burton, Emilie M, Tsutsui, Kiyoteru, and Meyer, John W. "International Human Rights Law and the Politics 
of Legitimation: Repressive States and Human Rights Treaties." International Sociology 23, no. 1 (2008): 115-41. 
Neumayer, Eric. "Do International Human Rights Treaties Improve Respect for Human Rights?" The Journal of 
Conflict Resolution 49, no. 6 (2005): 925-53. 
7 Hafner-Burton, Emilie M, Tsutsui, Kiyoteru, and Meyer, John W. "International Human Rights Law and the 
Politics of Legitimation: Repressive States and Human Rights Treaties": 115-41. 
8 Danceanu, Constanza Fernandez. "Systematic Review of the Causes of Latin American States' Compliance With 
International Human Rights Law”: 557. 
9  Danceanu, Constanza Fernandez. "Systematic Review of the Causes of Latin American States' Compliance With 
International Human Rights Law”: 557. 
10 Neumayer, Eric. "Do International Human Rights Treaties Improve Respect for Human Rights?": 926. 
4 
order to deflect pressure to respect human rights.11 Still, there are instances in which states do 
comply with international law, even when it may not fit their material interests. As a result, while 
realism does effectively explain why countries sometimes do not uphold human rights, it lacks 
an explanation as to why states sometimes do comply with international law, even when it does 
not fit their self-interest. 
 The liberal institutionalist perspective focuses on international regimes as a way for states 
to cooperate in order to gain long-term mutual benefits. According to Hillebrecht, “compliance 
with international law [is] a strategy for achieving international cooperation. Compliance with 
international law is a way for states to preserve their international reputation… and solve 
problems that have no clear domestic solution."12 While they agree with the realist principle that 
states follow their own self-interest, institutionalists argue that it is possible for states to 
cooperate long-term in order to achieve mutual self-interest. The key enforcement mechanisms 
for international law according to institutionalism are reciprocity and reputation, the idea that if 
states uphold their commitments then other states will act similarly, resulting in long-term 
benefits for all parties.13 While institutionalism would point to a more positive view of the 
prospects of international law than realism in most cases, Neumayer argues that it may not be 
more positive in the case of human rights because “it is somewhat questionable whether there are 
substantial mutual benefits from greater respect for human rights across countries."14 Further, 
institutionalism points out that states are unlikely to use sanctions to enforce human rights 
because “a sanction will only be credible if the threatening group of countries is better off 
 
11 Hathaway, Oona A. "Do Human Rights Treaties Make a Difference?" 
12 Hillebrecht, Courtney. "The Domestic Mechanisms of Compliance with International Human Rights Law: Case 
Studies from the Inter-American Human Rights System." Human Rights Quarterly 34, no. 4 (2012): 963. 
13 Danceanu, Constanza Fernandez. "Systematic Review of the Causes of Latin American States' Compliance With 
International Human Rights Law”: 558. 
14 Neumayer, Eric. "Do International Human Rights Treaties Improve Respect for Human Rights?”: 927. 
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actually executing the sanction than refraining," which is not true in the case of sanctions 
regarding noncompliance with human rights treaties.15 Therefore, while liberal institutionalism 
may explain how treaties are upheld long term, it is unclear exactly how well this strain of theory 
applies to human rights law. 
Constructivism asserts that states generally comply with international law as a result of 
the socialization process and norms within the international system. According to Danceanu, the 
foundation of constructivism is the belief that states “have shared norms shaped by cooperation, 
dialogue and inclusiveness."16 For example, according to Simmons, actors will comply with 
international law if they are socialized to comply through rewards and punishments as well as 
through changing values and identities during the socialization process.17 Similarly, Hawkins 
argues that the content of arguments has the greatest influence on the development of 
international law and compliance, rather than the power of outside forces as argued by realists.18 
He argues that, through the persuasion process, states are able to address their needs and 
interests, compromise on the ultimate outcome, and experience social pressure for compliance. 
Because the constructivist approach functions under the assumption that states are concerned 
about their reputations among other states, international human rights law will be upheld for fear 
of being seen as disinterested in human rights.19 While the constructivist approach to human 
rights compliance may hold up in some cases, as Hawkins demonstrates, it may fail to explain 
 
15 Neumayer, Eric. "Do International Human Rights Treaties Improve Respect for Human Rights?”: 927. 
16 Danceanu, Constanza Fernandez. "Systematic Review of the Causes of Latin American States' Compliance With 
International Human Rights Law”: 558. 
17 Danceanu, Constanza Fernandez. "Systematic Review of the Causes of Latin American States' Compliance With 
International Human Rights Law”: 559. 
18 Hawkins, Darren, and Jacoby, Wade. "A Comparison of the European and Inter-American Courts of Human 
Rights." JILIR : Journal of International Law & International Relations 6, no. 1 (2010): 780. 
19 Hawkins, Darren, and Jacoby, Wade. "A Comparison of the European and Inter-American Courts of Human 
Rights.": 787. 
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why some states appear relatively unconcerned with their international reputations and remain 
outside of the socialization process. 
 In the last several decades there has been a growth in scholarly interest in settling the 
debate regarding the influence of international law on state behavior. According to Hafner-
Burton and Ron, the first major studies on the impact of human rights law were undertaken in the 
1990s and focused on Latin and Central America, which had just undergone major 
transformations in the area of human rights.20 Such case studies generally promoted the idea that 
international human rights laws could have a positive impact on the global status of human 
rights.21 For example, Sikkink’s case studies on Argentina, Mexico, Guatemala, Uruguay, and 
Paraguay indicated that local activism against oppressive governments could eventually “shame 
Northern governments into policy change."22 Similarly, Danceanu works under the assumption 
that “compliance is the normal organizational presumption” in her “Review of the Causes of 
Latin American States’ Compliance” and provides these explanations for international law 
compliance in Latin America: sanction for non-compliance, ethics, reputation, naming and 
shaming, persuasion, membership, capacity, and domestic politics.23 However, these studies 
contain the issues which are typically present in qualitative research, such as a lack of 
standardization of measures and selection bias.24 While case studies are useful in determining the 
 
20 Hafner-Burton, Emilie, and Ron, James. "Seeing Double: Human Rights Impact through Qualitative and 
Quantitative Eyes." World Politics 61, no. 2 (2009): 366. 
21  Hafner-Burton, Emilie, and Ron, James. "Seeing Double: Human Rights Impact through Qualitative and 
Quantitative Eyes.": 366. 
22   Hafner-Burton, Emilie, and Ron, James. "Seeing Double: Human Rights Impact through Qualitative and 
Quantitative Eyes.": 366. 
23  Danceanu, Constanza Fernandez. "Systematic Review of the Causes of Latin American States' Compliance With 
International Human Rights Law." 
24   Hafner-Burton, Emilie, and Ron, James. "Seeing Double: Human Rights Impact through Qualitative and 
Quantitative Eyes.": 382. 
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details of individual cases, quantitative research is needed in order to determine the bigger 
picture of human rights compliance. 
 While quantitative research on compliance with international law is challenging because 
of the breadth of the field, the multitude of interpretations of compliance, and the lack of data on 
compliance, quantitative studies of international law compliance have begun to emerge in the last 
several decades, particularly in the field of human rights law. Hafner-Burton, Tsusui, and 
Meyer’s study, “International Human Rights Law and the Politics of Legitimation," makes this 
argument: 
1. The emergence of a global human rights regime in the last several decades has 
produced a normative expectation for every state to commit itself to human right 
protection; but 
2. Reaction to this normative pressure depends on variations in perception and 
realities of accountability for non-conformity.25 
They argue that, because of the failure to make noncompliance with international human rights 
law costly, repressive governments may perceive ratification of human rights treaties as a way to 
deflect criticism of their internal practices and improve their international standing without 
consequences.26 Therefore, their first hypothesis is that states with records of repression are more 
likely to commit to human rights regimes than those with no records of repression.27 Second, 
they hypothesize that repressive governments with greater autonomy from domestic oppositions 
are more likely to commit to human rights regimes than those with less autonomy.28 Using data 
from the US State Department Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor and Amnesty 
 
25 Hafner-Burton, Emilie M, Tsutsui, Kiyoteru, and Meyer, John W. "International Human Rights Law and the 
Politics of Legitimation: Repressive States and Human Rights Treaties": 121. 
26 Hafner-Burton, Emilie M, Tsutsui, Kiyoteru, and Meyer, John W. "International Human Rights Law and the 
Politics of Legitimation: Repressive States and Human Rights Treaties”: 123. 
27  Hafner-Burton, Emilie M, Tsutsui, Kiyoteru, and Meyer, John W. "International Human Rights Law and the 
Politics of Legitimation: Repressive States and Human Rights Treaties”: 123. 
28  Hafner-Burton, Emilie M, Tsutsui, Kiyoteru, and Meyer, John W. "International Human Rights Law and the 
Politics of Legitimation: Repressive States and Human Rights Treaties”: 125. 
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International, they confirm both hypotheses and, further, find that “the decoupling between 
policy and practice is more radical than [they] had imagined," indicating that repressive states 
often join human rights regimes without the intention of complying.29 
 Neumayer’s study “Do International Human Rights Treaties Improve Respect for Human 
Rights?” similarly attempts to quantify the extent to which international human rights law 
improves respect for human rights in ratifying countries. The study uses data from the two 
Purdue Political Terror Scales, which codify information from the U.S. Department of State’s 
Country Reports on Human Rights Practices and from Amnesty International reports, and 
compares countries’ levels of human rights compliance to their levels of treaty ratification.30 
Neumayer uses similar control variables to Hathaway, including a measure of the extent of 
external and internal armed conflict, the Polity measure of political democracy, per capita 
income, population size, and the number of international NGOS with domestic participation.31 
Neumayer’s findings show that “the beneficial effect of ratification… is typically conditional on 
the extent of democracy and the strength of civil society groups," meaning that treaty ratification 
is likely to have a positive effect on respect for human rights in democratic countries, but a 
negative impact on human rights in the absence of democratic civil society.32 
A similar study by Hathaway attempts to quantify international human rights law 
compliance using various data sets on genocide, torture, fair trial, civil liberty, and women’s 
political equality.33 In the first portion of the quantitative analysis, she studies the relationship 
between treaty ratification and country ratings and finds that countries that have ratified human 
 
29  Hafner-Burton, Emilie M, Tsutsui, Kiyoteru, and Meyer, John W. "International Human Rights Law and the 
Politics of Legitimation: Repressive States and Human Rights Treaties”: 132. 
30 Neumayer, Eric. "Do International Human Rights Treaties Improve Respect for Human Rights?": 938. 
31  Neumayer, Eric. "Do International Human Rights Treaties Improve Respect for Human Rights?": 939. 
32 Neumayer, Eric. "Do International Human Rights Treaties Improve Respect for Human Rights?": 926. 
33 Hathaway, Oona A. "Do Human Rights Treaties Make a Difference?" 
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rights treaties generally have better human rights ratings than those who have not.34 However, 
while countries that have ratified human rights treaties do have higher ratings on average, she 
finds evidence that countries with poor human rights ratings are sometimes more likely to have 
ratified relevant human rights treaties.35 Overall, her findings contradict the common claim that 
compliance with treaties is the norm.36 Next, Hathaway attempts to measure whether countries 
that have ratified treaties are more likely to conform to the requirements of the treaty. She draws 
on previous research to select these control variables: international war, civil war, population 
size, population growth, and the age of the regime in power.37 The results indicate that treaty 
ratification is actually often associated with worse human rights practices than otherwise 
expected.38 Hathaway concludes that external pressure encourages states to ratify human rights 
treaties, but the lack of monitoring and enforcement of human rights treaties means there is little 
incentive for ratifying states to make the costly policy changes it would take to uphold human 
rights law.39 
The findings of Hathaway’s study and similar studies indicate that states resistant to 
human rights compliance are not likely to comply with international human rights law unless the 
costs of noncompliance are greater than the costs of compliance. This finding raises the question 
as to in what situations will other countries raise the costs of noncompliance in order to induce 
compliance. Choi’s study “What Determines US Humanitarian Intervention?” focuses on 
competing explanations for US humanitarian intervention. According to Choi, realists argue that 
the decision to intervene is based on national interests, such as “securing the supply of oil or 
 
34 Hathaway, Oona A. "Do Human Rights Treaties Make a Difference?": 1976. 
35  Hathaway, Oona A. "Do Human Rights Treaties Make a Difference?": 1978. 
36  Hathaway, Oona A. "Do Human Rights Treaties Make a Difference?": 1987. 
37  Hathaway, Oona A. "Do Human Rights Treaties Make a Difference?": 1990. 
38  Hathaway, Oona A. "Do Human Rights Treaties Make a Difference?": 1989. 
39   Hathaway, Oona A. "Do Human Rights Treaties Make a Difference?": 2020. 
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expanding power interests."40 Choi tests this argument using indicators of national interest 
including oil exports, alliances, and geographical proximity.41 Conversely, liberals argue that 
humanitarian interventions are “a manifestation of America’s moral obligations and 
responsibilities as a world leader."42 Choi tests this argument using the level of human rights 
violations in a given country, assuming that, if the liberal argument is correct, the US should be 
more likely to intervene in places with worse rights violations.43 Based on his research, Choi 
determines that US interventions are generally better explained by the level of violence in a 
given country than US national security interests, indicating that liberalism is a better theory for 
explaining humanitarian intervention.44 
 A similar study by Yoon attempts to quantify reasons for US intervention in Third World 
internal wars following the end of World War II. Yoon tests realist variables, including 
intervention by the Soviet Union, communism, strategic importance to the United States, and 
geographical proximity, as well as economic variables including US dependence on raw 
material, the importance of the market to the US, and US foreign investment.45 Yoon finds little 
evidence for the economic explanations of US intervention, but finds that the realist explanations 
do have a statistically significant effect on the likelihood of US intervention. Conversely, 
Fordham’s study, “Power or Plenty? Economic Interests, Security Concerns, and American 
Intervention” argues that studies such as Yoon’s which do not find evidence of economic impact 
fail to consider the indirect effects of US economic interests, such as the long-term impact of 
 
40 Choi, Seung-Whan. "What Determines US Humanitarian Intervention?" Conflict Management and Peace Science 
30, no. 2 (2013): 122. 
41 Choi, Seung-Whan. "What Determines US Humanitarian Intervention?": 126. 
42 Choi, Seung-Whan. "What Determines US Humanitarian Intervention?": 122. 
43 Choi, Seung-Whan. "What Determines US Humanitarian Intervention?": 125. 
44 Choi, Seung-Whan. "What Determines US Humanitarian Intervention?": 128. 
45 Yoon, Mi Yung. "Explaining U.S. Intervention in Third World Internal Wars, 1945-1989." The Journal of 
Conflict Resolution 41, no. 4 (1997): 583. 
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economic concerns on US alliance making.46 Fordham tests security interests, including the 
presence of allies and the presence of rivals, and economic interests, measured by foreign direct 
investment, and determines that the initial test confirms Yoon’s idea that security concerns are 
more influential than economic concerns on US foreign policy.47 However, he demonstrates 
through further tests that alliances are often formed based on economic considerations, indicating 
that economic factors do have an indirect effect on US foreign policy.48 Overall, these two 
studies indicate that security concerns have a more immediate effect on US intervention, but that 
economic concerns are indirectly involved. 
 Previous quantitative research regarding international law enforcement leaves open a gap 
regarding what factors influence military intervention into human rights violations. Choi and 
Yoon successfully demonstrate the importance of security concerns in determining US decisions 
to intervene. However, as Fordham points out, the importance of economic factors may be 
undervalued by previous researchers, including Choi and Yoon. This article will thus treat 
economic variables as indicators of humanitarian intervention that require further exploration. 
Further, previous scholars consider political explanations of humanitarian intervention such as 
alliance politics, but fail to consider the way diplomatic relationships outside of security alliances 
impact the likelihood of intervention. This is surprising given that political interests have a large 
impact on state behavior. Therefore, this study will focus on diplomatic alignment as a second 
indicator of humanitarian intervention. 
QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 
 
46 Fordham, Benjamin O. "Power or Plenty? Economic Interests, Security Concerns, and American Intervention." 
International Studies Quarterly 52, no. 4 (2008): 737. 
47 Fordham, Benjamin O. "Power or Plenty? Economic Interests, Security Concerns, and American Intervention”: 
745. 
48  Fordham, Benjamin O. "Power or Plenty? Economic Interests, Security Concerns, and American Intervention”: 
751. 
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This article will focus primarily on US-sponsored humanitarian interventions for two 
reasons. First, there is a large breadth of data available regarding US relationships with other 
countries as well as US motivations. Second, many scholars essentially argue that US decisions 
and global decisions are interchangeable because of the predominance of US policy, particularly 
following the Cold War at the height of US hegemony. For example, Stoll argues that “the 
United States largely initiated and contributed to today’s international legal system, and can still 
be considered to have an enormous and exceptional potential in terms of military and economic 
power."49 Similarly, Labonte points out that 
[The United States] plays a highly important role in shaping international policy 
concerning responses to mass atrocities, including humanitarian intervention. Moreover, 
without US support it would be extremely difficult (possibly impractical) for the Security 
Council or a coalition of the willing to sanction the use of force to halt or prevent mass 
atrocities, including cases that today would be classified as R2P cases. In other words, the 
international community of states will not be persuaded to take robust action in halting 
mass atrocities if Washington is not persuaded.50 
As these two scholars indicate, it is largely accepted that the United States has a large influence 
over international decision making, particularly immediately following the Cold War. This 
makes it possible to use US decision making as an indicator of international decision making. 
However, this is not to say that the US is able to enforce its preferences unchallenged within the 
international system. As Bearsdley finds, although the interests of the US and the other members 
of the P-5 are important determinants of UN action, the organizational mission of the UN is also 
a powerful influence on humanitarian intervention.51 However, for the convenience of this study, 
 
49 Byers, Michael, and Nolte, Georg. “Compliance." In United States Hegemony and the Foundations of 
International Law. Cambridge, UK ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003: 457. 
50 Labonte, Melissa. Human Rights and Humanitarian Norms, Strategic Framing, and Intervention : Lessons for the 
Responsibility to Protect. Global Institutions Series ; 71. New York: Routledge, 2012: 14. 
51 Beardsley, Kyle, and Schmidt, Holger. "Following the Flag or Following the Charter? Examining the 
Determinants of UN Involvement in International Crises, 1945-2002." International Studies Quarterly 56, no. 1 
(2012): 46. 
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United States foreign policy will be treated as a reasonable indicator of the likelihood of 
international humanitarian intervention. 
 I provide three hypotheses for the quantitative portion of this study. The first hypothesis 
focuses on diplomatic proximity as measured by voting habits within the United Nations: 
Hypothesis 1: The United States will be less likely to intervene in personal integrity 
violations in countries with more similar voting patterns in the United Nations. 
As Akhavan argues, “whether military action is taken in a given situation is determined by the 
political interests at stake.”52 While the political will is certainly influenced by geostrategic 
interests, as previous scholars argue, I argue that it is additionally influenced by diplomatic 
alignment. For example, I would expect the United States to be less willing to intervene in 
human rights violations in a country with which it had strong diplomatic ties because it would be 
unwilling to destabilize a relationship with a potential ally or trading partner. Therefore, I argue 
that the United States will be less likely to intervene in countries with more similar voting 
patterns in the United Nations.  
The second hypothesis focuses on democracy as an indicator of intervention: 
Hypothesis 2: The United States will be more likely to intervene in personal integrity 
violations in countries with medium to high levels of democratization. 
I argue that the United States will be more likely to intervene in countries with higher levels of 
democratization because human rights violations in democracies represent more of a threat to the 
international order. This view is confirmed by Choi, who argues that “when the United States 
employs its military abroad to protect human rights, it also aims at advancing or defending 
democracy as a system of government."53 Additionally, the United States is more likely to be 
 
52 Akhavan, Payam. "Enforcement of the Genocide Convention: A Challenge to Civilization." Harvard Human 
Rights Journal 8 (1995): 18. 
53 Choi, Seung-Whan. "What Determines US Humanitarian Intervention?": 126. 
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willing to intervene in an established democracy than in an authoritarian state with the potential 
to require nation building by the United States. However, as Paranti argues, the United States is 
not always as concerned with democracy as it may claim to be. For example, during the Cold 
War, the United States habitually favored authoritarian regimes over democratically elected 
communist governments in Latin America.54 Consequently, it is plausible that there will not be a 
relationship between democracy and intervention. 
 The third hypothesis focuses on economic indicators of intervention: 
Hypothesis 3: The United States will be less likely to intervene in personal integrity 
violations in countries with more integrated economies. 
I argue that the United States will be less likely to intervene in personal integrity violations in 
countries with which it shares greater levels of trade because it will not want to disrupt the trade 
flow. For example, assuming that the United States would use diplomatic strategies such as 
economic sanctions before beginning a military intervention, US leaders could expect significant 
backlash over disrupted trade with important trading partners. However, it is also possible that 
the relationship will go the other way because the US may want to protect the trade flow from 
the kind of disruption caused by humanitarian crises. Overall, I expect economic factors to be an 
important indicator for the likelihood to intervene because of the importance of economic factors 
in political decision making.  
EXPLANATORY VARIABLES 
 Diplomatic proximity with the United States is measured by the ideal point estimates 
from Voeten, Strezhnev, and Bailey’s “United Nations General Assembly Voting Data."55 The 
 
54 Parenti, Michael. "Determining Intent: Why Do US Leaders Intervene in Other Countries?" New Political Science 
24, no. 1 (2002): 44. 
55 Voeten, E., Strezhnev, A., & Bailey, M. (2021, May 6). United Nations General Assembly Voting Data. Harvard 
Dataverse. https://dataverse.harvard.edu/dataset.xhtml?persistentId=doi%3A10.7910%2FDVN%2FLEJUQZ.  
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UN General Assembly Voting data set contains data on roll-call votes in the UN General 
Assembly from 1946 through 2020. This data is translated into ideal point estimates based on 
voting patterns as described in “Estimating Dynamic States Preferences from United Nations 
Voting Data."56 The ideal point distance has become the standard data source for constructing 
measures of states preferences because it contains concrete, measurable actions from most 
countries over a long period of time.57 The ideal point distance is used in this study as a measure 
of diplomatic alignment with the United States using data on relationships between the United 
States and all countries included from 1991 to 2001. 
 Levels of democratization are measured by the Polity Score which provides scores from -
10 for full autocracy to +10 for full democracy.58 Choi uses the polity score as a measure of 
democracy in his study of what determines US humanitarian intervention, as does Fordham in 
his analysis of the effects of political and economic interests on intervention.59 Polity 2 data from 
1991 to 2001 is used for this study. Polity 2 is chosen over Polity 1 because it has less missing 
data for the time period in consideration. 
 Economic integration with the United States is measured through trade balance, exports 
and imports, US foreign direct investment, gross domestic product, and fuel exports as a 
percentage of merchandise exports. Yoon uses foreign direct investment and trade as measures of 
US economic interests, while Fordham uses only foreign direct investment.60 I use both foreign 
 
56 Bailey, Michael A, Strezhnev, Anton, and Voeten, Erik. "Estimating Dynamic State Preferences from United 
Nations Voting Data." The Journal of Conflict Resolution 61, no. 2 (2017): 430-56. 
57 Bailey, Michael A, Strezhnev, Anton, and Voeten, Erik. "Estimating Dynamic State Preferences from United 
Nations Voting Data”: 431. 
58 INSCR Data Page. Accessed July 16, 2021. http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscrdata.html.  
59 Choi, Seung-Whan. "What Determines US Humanitarian Intervention?" 
Fordham, Benjamin O. "Power or Plenty? Economic Interests, Security Concerns, and American Intervention."  
60 Yoon, Mi Yung. "Explaining U.S. Intervention in Third World Internal Wars, 1945-1989": 588. 
Fordham, Benjamin O. "Power or Plenty? Economic Interests, Security Concerns, and American Intervention."  
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direct investment and exports measured in US dollars.61 I additionally add gross domestic 
product as a measure of the size of the economy, assuming that the US will be more concerned 
with countries with larger economies.62 In addition, I add a measure of US fuel reliance. 
Beardsley argues that oil reliance is a top long term security concern in the United States, so 
issues involving oil exporters will draw particular attention.63 I operationalize this argument 
using World Bank data on oil exports as a percentage of merchandise exports.64 
RESPONSE VARIABLES 
 The response variable measured in this research is US intervention in cases of human 
rights violations. I include measures for personal integrity violations and humanitarian 
intervention as separate response variables in order to obtain the most data. Personal integrity 
rights violations “include the right to life and the inviolability of the human person. Violations of 
personal integrity rights include prolonged and arbitrary detention, extrajudicial killing, torture, 
genocide, and other severe violations of bodily integrity.”65 For the purpose of this research, the 
data on violations of personal integrity rights will be used to explore the relationship between the 
United States and countries with high levels of rights violations. This data is valuable to 
measurements of intervention as long as we assume that high levels of rights violations will 
cease following US intervention. This data comes from two primary data sets: the Political 
 




 “World Development Indicators." Accessed July 16, 2021. DataBank. (n.d.). 
https://databank.worldbank.org/reports.aspx?source=2&series=NY.GDP.MKTP.CD&country=#.  
62 “World Development Indicators."  
63 Beardsley, Kyle, and Schmidt, Holger. "Following the Flag or Following the Charter? Examining the 
Determinants of UN Involvement in International Crises, 1945-2002": 40. 
64 “World Development Indicators."  
65 Hafner-Burton, Emilie, and Ron, James. "Seeing Double: Human Rights Impact through Qualitative and 
Quantitative Eyes”: 364. 
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Terror Scale, which gives a rating of one through five, with five being the highest possible 
amount of government inflicted terror, and the CIRI human rights data, which gives a rating of 
zero through eight, eight being the highest level of respect for human rights.66 Second, there is a 
limited amount of data on humanitarian intervention. I include the Kisangani and Pickering 
dataset on international military intervention which provides data on various types of 
intervention. I include only cases which the dataset lists as humanitarian intervention. I add a 
score of one for US involvement and zero for no US involvement as a second variable.67 I use a 
linear regression to find the relationship between each of the response variables, shown across 
the top row of Table 1, with each explanatory variable, shown in the first column in Table 1. 
RESULTS 
Table 1: Multiple Regression Results 






















Polity 2 -0.017* -0.015* 0.043** -0.003** -0.003** 
Voeten Ideal 
Point Distance 
0.545** 0.469** -1.221** -0.019** -0.021** 
Exports (US$ 
Thousand) 




-1.238E-6 -1.864E-6 7.059E-7 -2.728E-7 -2.826E-7 
Gross Domestic 
Product 
3.667E-14 4.305E-14 -1.422E-13 -5.445E-15 -4.329E-16 
 
66 “The Political Terror Scale." Accessed July 16, 2021. http://www.politicalterrorscale.org/About/.  
CIRI Human Rights Data Project. (n.d.). http://www.humanrightsdata.com/p/data-documentation.html.  
67 “International Military Intervention.” Kansas State University. Accessed July 19, 2021. https://www.k-
state.edu/polsci/intervention/.  
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-0.001 0.001 0.003 0.001** 0.001** 
      
Adj. R² 0.241 0.194 0.311 0.029 0.029 
N 956 813 900 963 963 
*Significant at the .05 level 
**Significant at the .01 level 
 The results of the multiple regression are reported in Table 1. The first hypothesis 
predicts that the Voeten ideal point distance should have a positive relationship with the Political 
Terror Scale, assuming that higher levels of intervention correlate with lower levels of human 
rights violations. Because the Cingranelli and Richards data is coded so that eight is the lowest 
level of human rights violations, the Voeten ideal point distance should have a negative 
relationship with the CIRI data in order to indicate the same relationship. The results confirm 
that the Voeten ideal point distance has a statistically significant positive relationship with both 
sets of Political Terror Scale data and a negative relationship with the CIRI data. Additionally, 
the Voeten ideal point distance should have a negative relationship with the Kisangani and 
Pickering International Military Intervention Dataset. The results confirm a statistically 
significant negative relationship between the Voeten ideal point distance and the Kisangani and 
Pickering data, both with and without US involvement. 
 The second hypothesis predicts that the Polity Score should have a positive relationship 
with the Cingranelli and Richards data and a negative relationship with the Political Terror Scale 
data. The results confirm that there is a statistically significant negative relationship between the 
Polity Score and both sets of Political Terror Scale data, as well as a statistically significant 
positive relationship between the Polity Score and the CIRI human rights data. We would expect 
19 
this kind of correlation because the Polity Score takes human rights violations into account as 
part of its system of measuring democracy. Additionally, the hypothesis predicts that there 
should be a positive relationship between the Polity Score and the military intervention 
indicators. The results show a statistically significant negative relationship between the Polity 
Score and the  Kisangani and Pickering international military intervention dataset, indicating that 
there may actually be a negative relationship between Polity and likelihood of intervention. 
 The third hypothesis predicts that there should be a positive relationship between all 
indicators of economic integration and the Political Terror Scale data given the argument that 
higher levels of economic integration will result in a lower likelihood of intervention, assuming 
that lower levels of intervention mean higher levels of rights violations. Similarly, the hypothesis 
predicts a negative relationship between the economic indicators and the Cingranelli and 
Richards human rights data, which would indicate that higher levels of economic integration 
resulted in higher levels of rights violations. None of the economic indicators have statistically 
significant relationships with either the Political Terror Scale data or the CIRI human rights data. 
Additionally, there should be a negative relationship between the economic indicators and the 
military intervention data sets. However, there is a statistically significant positive relationship 
between oil exports as a percentage of merchandise exports and the Kisangani and Pickering 
international military intervention data, both with and without US involvement. I ran additional 
regressions using either exports or GDP as indicators rather than combining them to ensure that 
the data was not losing significance due to collinearity, but did not find this to be the case. None 
of the other economic indicators have statistically significant relationships with either set of 
military intervention data. I additionally include a logit regression in order to better test the 
relationship between the explanatory variables and the dichotomous military intervention data. 
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Table 2: Logit Regression Results 
 
 Kisangani and Pickering 
International Military Intervention 
Dataset 
Kisangani and Pickering 
International Military Intervention 
Dataset (US Involved) 
Polity 2 -0.086* -0.096 
Voeten Ideal Point Distance -0.918** -1.584** 
Exports (US$ Thousand) 1.109E-7 1.629E-6** 
US Foreign Direct Investment -0.001 -0.001** 
Gross Domestic Product -8.989E-12 -1.651E-11 
Oil Exports as a Percentage of 
Merchandise Exports 
0.019** 0.0290** 
   
N 962 962 
*Significant at the .05 level 
**Significant at the .01 level 
 The first hypothesis would predict a negative relationship between Voeten ideal point 
distance and the Kisangani and Pickering Military Intervention dataset. As shown in Table 2, the 
data from the logit regression confirms that there is a statistically significant negative 
relationship between the Voeten ideal point distance and the Kisangani and Pickering data, both 
with and without US involvement. Notably, the relationship is stronger with US involvement 
than without, which provides further evidence that US involvement is a key facet of the 
relationship between diplomatic alignment and intervention. 
 The second hypothesis would predict a positive relationship between the Polity Score and 
the international military intervention data. However, the data indicates that there is a statistically 
significant negative relationship between the Polity Score and military intervention. While this 
would suggest that the United States is less likely to intervene in countries with medium to high 
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levels of democratization, it is more likely a result of spuriousness in the data. The Polity Score 
uses human rights violations as a measure of polity, so countries with higher polity scores are 
guaranteed to have lower levels of human rights violations. This would indicate that there would 
be no need for humanitarian intervention, so the relationship found by the logit regression is 
likely spurious. There is no statistically significant relationship between the Polity Score and US-
sponsored intervention, though this may be a result of the lack of data for US-sponsored 
intervention rather than an indicator of a lack of relationship between the two variables. 
 The third hypothesis would predict a negative relationship between Voeten ideal point 
distance and the Kisangani and Pickering Military Intervention dataset. The data confirms a 
statistically significant negative relationship between US Foreign Direct Investment and the 
Kisangani and Pickering intervention data. However, the data finds a statistically significant 
positive relationship between exports and US-sponsored intervention, as well as a statistically 
significant relationship between oil exports as a percentage of merchandise exports and the 
international military intervention dataset, both with and without US involvement.  
DISCUSSION 
Hypothesis one states that the United States will be less likely to intervene in personal 
integrity violations in countries with more similar voting patterns in the United Nations. The 
results of the multiple regression indicate that there is a statistically significant positive 
relationship between the Voeten ideal point distance and the Political Terror Scale. Since the 
Political Terror Scale data is coded from one to five, one being the lowest levels of rights 
violations and five being the highest, the data indicates that countries with more similar voting 
records to the United States will be more likely to have high levels of domestic rights violations. 
The results also show a statistically significant negative relationship between the Voeten ideal 
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point distance and the Cingranelli-Richards human rights data set. Since the CIRI dataset is 
coded from zero to eight, with zero being the least respect for human rights and eight being the 
most respect for human rights, this indicates that countries with closer diplomatic relationships 
with the United States will be less likely to have high levels of respect for human rights. 
Assuming that international intervention into rights violations will result in lower levels of rights 
violations over time, I make the argument based on this data that the United States is less likely 
to intervene in human rights violations in countries that diplomatically align themselves with the 
United States, meaning that the hypothesis is correct. However, it is also possible that this 
relationship is influenced by the relationship between democracy and rights violations. 
Respecting human rights is part of being classified as a democracy, and democracies are likely to 
have similar voting patterns to the United States. Therefore, it may actually be that countries that 
diplomatically align themselves with the United States are unlikely to commit rights violations, 
rather than that the United States is less likely to intervene.  
 The Voeten ideal point distance is additionally tested with data on intervention. Again, 
the results indicate a statistically significant negative relationship between the Voeten ideal point 
distance and the Kisangani and Pickering international military intervention data, both in 
interventions when the US is involved and when it is not. This confirms the previous assertion 
that the United States is less likely to intervene in human rights violations in countries that are 
more closely diplomatically aligned with the United States. 
 Hypothesis two states that the United States will be more likely to intervene in personal 
integrity violations in countries with higher levels of democratization. The hypothesis correctly 
predicts that the Polity score has a statistically significant negative relationship with the Political 
Terror Scores both from the States Department and from Amnesty International. This indicates 
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that lower levels of democracy are associated with higher levels of state sponsored terror. 
Similarly, the Polity score has a statistically significant positive relationship with the Cingranelli 
and Richards human rights index, indicating that higher levels of democracy correspond with 
higher levels of respect for human rights. However, it is likely that these results are due to the 
relationship between high levels of democracy and high levels of human rights rather than 
international enforcement. In fact, the results from both the regression and the logit regression 
indicate that there is a negative relationship between the Polity score and the Kisangani and 
Pickering international intervention data. This suggests that the United States is actually less 
likely to intervene in human rights violations in countries with high levels of democracy. While 
it is likely that the United States would not want to intervene in a highly democratic country with 
which it would likely have a strong diplomatic relationship, it is also possible that these results 
merely reflect the lessened likelihood of human rights violations in highly democratic countries 
rather than a negative relationship between democracy and intervention. 
Hypothesis three states that the United States will be less likely to intervene in personal 
integrity violations in countries with more integrated economies. The regression results indicate 
this to be false, but only find a statistically significant relationship with one variable, oil exports 
as a percentage as merchandise exports, which has a positive relationship with the Kisangani and 
Pickering intervention data. These findings differ from Choi, who does not find a statistically 
significant relationship between intervention and his oil supply variable.68 This is likely a result 
of the fact that Choi uses a dummy variable for oil exporting countries, while I use oil exports as 
a percentage of merchandise exports. This allows me to measure changes to the relationship 
between intervention and smaller and larger amounts of oil exports, rather than oil exports as a 
 
68 Choi, Seung-Whan. "What Determines US Humanitarian Intervention?": 128. 
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whole. As a result, it appears that the United States is more concerned with countries that export 
large amounts of oil. The logit regression finds more statistically significant relationships 
between economic indicators and the Kisangani and Pickering intervention data. It suggests that 
intervention by the United States is more likely in countries with high levels of exports to the 
United States. Similarly, both international and US-sponsored intervention are more likely in 
countries with high percentages of oil as a percentage of merchandise exports. However, it finds 
that US-sponsored intervention is less likely in countries with high levels of US foreign direct 
investment. Overall, it does appear to confirm the hypothesis that the United States is more likely 
to intervene in countries with highly-integrated economies, though this conclusion is confounded 
slightly by the negative relationship between US foreign direct investment and US-sponsored 
intervention. 
Given the high level of concern for the economy within the US government, it is 
somewhat surprising that so few of the economic variables turn out to have a statistically 
significant relationship with US intervention. These findings are corroborated by previous 
scholars. For example, Choi initially argues that, because developed countries have fewer people 
living below the poverty line, people in developed countries will be less prone to violence and 
their governments will have more resources to deal with violence.69 This indicates that the 
United States should be more prone to intervene in countries with low levels of economic 
development. However, similar to my findings, Choi does not find a statistically significant 
relationship between economic development and intervention. Fordham also does not find a 
statistically significant relationship between intervention and his economic indicators.70 
 
69  Choi, Seung-Whan. "What Determines US Humanitarian Intervention?": 127. 
70 Fordham, Benjamin O. "Power or Plenty? Economic Interests, Security Concerns, and American Intervention": 
746. 
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However, Fordham does find evidence that trade has influenced who the United States forms 
alliances with.71 This suggests that security concerns measured by alliances have an immediate 
influence on intervention, but economic interests have a long term impact on intervention.72 In 
regards to my data, this suggests that, while economic variables may not have the kind of 
immediate impact that would show up in this study, they likely play a long term role in shaping 
other variables which do have short term effects, such as diplomatic alignment. 
 This study contains several potential sources of spuriousness. First, Beardsley 
demonstrates in his study of the determinants of UN involvement in international crises that 
decisions to intervene by the UN are influenced more heavily by the general desire to uphold the 
UN Charter than by the desires of individual P5 members.73 Similarly, Scott argues that 
“international law is more than simply a blank slate onto which the most powerful can translate 
their policy desires," suggesting that the United States does not have full, unchallenged control 
over decisions made within the international system.74 Thus, it is possible that this study 
overvalues the amount of US influence on international decisions to intervene, particularly in 
instances of UN-sponsored intervention. Second, as Binder demonstrates, none of the 
humanitarian crises between 1991 and 2004 went completely unaddressed; some kind of 
international response, usually in the form of humanitarian aid, was always present.75 This 
indicates that by focusing on military intervention this study may overlook other types of 
responses to human rights crises. Finally, the relationship between political proximity to the US 
 
71 Fordham, Benjamin O. "Power or Plenty? Economic Interests, Security Concerns, and American Intervention": 
751. 
72 Fordham, Benjamin O. "Power or Plenty? Economic Interests, Security Concerns, and American Intervention": 
754. 
73 Beardsley, Kyle, and Schmidt, Holger. "Following the Flag or Following the Charter? Examining the 
Determinants of UN Involvement in International Crises, 1945-2002”: 33-49. 
74 Byers, Michael, and Nolte, Georg. “Compliance”: 449-450. 
75 Binder, Martin. "Humanitarian Crises and the International Politics of Selectivity": 343. 
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and likelihood of intervention may be influenced by democracy for two reasons. First, it is 
reasonable to assume that democratic countries will tend to have a high level of diplomatic 
alignment with the United States. Since diplomatic countries tend to have higher levels of respect 
for rights, this is a possible source of endogeneity. Second, as Dancenau points out, states 
seeking international recognition may view respecting human rights as a means to that end.76 
Countries which are seeking approval of the United States may choose both to respect human 
rights and vote in line with the US in the United Nations, thus providing another potential source 
of endogeneity.  
CONCLUSION 
In summary, the results of this study indicate that the likelihood of intervention has a 
statistically significant relationship with both measures of democracy and measures of 
diplomatic alignment. In regards to the debate between the optimistic view and the skeptical 
view of international human rights law, I would argue that these results lend themselves more to 
the skeptical view. According to the optimistic view, substantial changes occurred following the 
end of the Cold War, including the “emerging norm of justified intervention” into human rights 
crises and an increased focus on “human security” within the Security Council.77 This diverges 
from the more skeptical view of international human rights law which argues that material forces 
dictate state behavior, rather than norms regarding human rights.78 This view emphasises the 
inconsistencies in international responses to human rights which are clearly present in my data. 
For example, my data indicates that in instances of human rights violations, the choice to 
intervene is influenced by political considerations and likely also economic considerations to 
 
76 Danceanu, Constanza Fernandez. "Systematic Review of the Causes of Latin American States' Compliance With 
International Human Rights Law": 561. 
77 Binder, Martin. "Humanitarian Crises and the International Politics of Selectivity": 330. 
78  Binder, Martin. "Humanitarian Crises and the International Politics of Selectivity": 330. 
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some extent. While Choi proves that the level of violence involved in human rights violations 
does have a significant influence on the decision to intervene, it is still the case that cases where 
there was no intervention into countries violating human rights may have occurred because of 
political or economic concerns, rather than humanitarian reasoning.79 Overall, it appears that the 
United State’s decisions to intervene are influenced by political considerations, resulting in the 
aforementioned selectivity gap and discrepancies in international responses to human rights 
violations. 
 The data from this study additionally has implications for the strain of research which 
focuses on the growing trend of countries ratifying human rights law without any apparent 
intention of compliance. As Hafner-Burton argues,  
This failure to make non-compliance costly is both wide-spread around the world and 
observable; states witness only the most limited repercussions of violations of human 
rights treaties and, over time, have learned that nonconformity is relatively inexpensive. 
Repressive governments accordingly are likely to perceive ratification of human rights 
treaties as an easy way to deflect criticism about their domestic violations and improve 
their standing in the international community.80 
According to this argument, repressive states will frequently ratify human rights treaties to obtain 
the diplomatic legitimization that comes along with treaty ratification, but will not actually 
implement the treaties because the costs of implementing the treaties are higher than the costs of 
failing to do so. Neumayer adds to this argument that the implementation of treaties is more 
likely in democracies as well as autocracies with strong civil societies, but unlikely in 
autocracies with no civil society, which have the ability to fail to implement treaties with little 
domestic backlash.81 Based on the data from this study, I would additionally expect to see that 
 
79 Choi, Seung-Whan. "What Determines US Humanitarian Intervention?" 
80 Hafner-Burton, Emilie M, Tsutsui, Kiyoteru, and Meyer, John W. "International Human Rights Law and the 
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countries’ abilities to ratify treaties that they do not expect to implement are influenced by their 
relationships with the United States. For example, a country that aligns itself closely with the 
United States might be more likely to get away with this kind of behavior than one which already 
has a tumultuous relationship with the US. Thus, Hafner-Burton and Neumayer’s studies may 
benefit from the consideration of external factors that can influence international law 
enforcement as well as their included internal indicators of compliance. Overall, I argue that the 
realist argument that states will only comply with international law when it is enforced by a 
hegemon is correct, though democracies do appear to be an exception to this rule. 
Nondemocracies appear to ratify international human rights law in order to gain a boost in their 
international reputations and will only actually uphold international law if it is enforced by the 
hegemon or the international community as a whole, as realists argue. 
 Finally, the data from this study highlights a few potential areas for future study. First, 
this study relies on the assumption that the United States has a significant effect on international 
decisions to intervene. In order for this assumption to be accurate, I focus on a time period in 
which the United States was a clear hegemon. However, as the international system shifts away 
from US hegemony, I would expect to see its priorities shift away from predominant US 
interests, meaning that intervention may no longer be so strongly influenced by US political and 
economic concerns. Future research might focus on less US-centric indicators of intervention. 
Second, as Binder argues, military intervention is not the only meaningful international response 
to human rights crises.82 Future research might attempt to discern whether the indicators used in 
this study have significant relationships with alternative responses to human rights crises. 
Finally, much of the research surrounding the influence of politics and polity on responses to 
 
82  Binder, Martin. "Humanitarian Crises and the International Politics of Selectivity": 343. 
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human rights crises assumes that democracies will be more likely to respond to human rights 
violations because of domestic backlash. Future research might focus on the influence of the 
media in determining the level of international response to human rights crises.  
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